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The Emergence of Regional Policy in Bulgaria: regional 






In most of the European transition economies regional policy is a 
relatively new phenomenon, given the absence of a coherent framework for 
such policy during the Communist era. In Southeast Europe in particular, 
regional policy was slow to develop also in the transition period. This was 
in many respects due to the relative hysteresis of the transition process in 
the region but also to other particularities related to the ethnic conflicts 
and a generally slower European association process. Regional policy in 
Bulgaria has for all analytical purposes been notably absent in the 1990s 
and only started shaping up mainly as a response to EU pressures and 
requirements. This was despite the significant problems of disparity and 
backwardness faced by many regional and local economies of the country – 
and the trend of widening inequality associated with the processes of 
transition and fast economic growth. Nevertheless (or, as a consequence), 
the emerging regional policy framework in Bulgaria reflects strongly the 
EU influence and shows little sensitivity to, and appreciation of, the main 
regional and spatial problems that policy in the country should be 
addressing. This paper addresses the structure and effectiveness of the 
emerging regional policy in Bulgaria by evaluating the nature of regional 
disparities in the country, examining the development of regional policy, 
and discussing the role played by the EU (through its accession 
conditionality, its own regional policy and its pre-accession aid) for these 
developments. This analysis provides useful conclusions regarding the 
strengths and weaknesses of Bulgaria’s regional policy and helps highlight 
the main challenges for the future design of regional policy in the country, 
in its new phase of development as a full EU member. 
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The collapse of the communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe almost two decades ago brought about sweeping changes in the 
economic and political institutions of the formerly centrally planned 
economies. With the critical influence of a number of supranational and 
international institutions an unprecedented process of transition took off in 
these countries, encompassing both the political and economic spheres. 
The main political (democratisation, civil society, institution-building) and 
economic (market liberalisation, privatisation and restructuring, 
macroeconomic stabilisation) priorities under this process (Roland, 2000; 
Sokol, 2001) were meant to address the key problems that the transition 
countries were facing in the advent of the 1990s: very centralised and 
inefficient state bureaucracies; inefficient organisation of production (both 
within firms and across sectors or space); lack of private and, importantly, 
financial capital; and a disparity between use-values, market prices and 
production costs (Pickles and Smith, 1998; Lavigne, 1999). More importantly, 
however, they aimed at two much more immediate and crucial deficits: on the 
one hand, the democratic deficit and problems in the rule of law; on the other, 
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the problems of indebtedness and hyper-inflation that the fast monetisation of 
the economy and the liberalisation of the market mechanisms brought about 
(EBRD, 1996; Pickles and Smith, 1998). In this context, attention to issues of 
regional and cohesion policy was at best limited. 
This deficiency of regional policy is of course important on theoretical 
grounds, given the fact that persistent regional imbalances raise issues not only 
of economic cohesion and social justice, but also of economic efficiency. 
Substantial and persistent income and unemployment differentials lead to 
inflationary pressures for the national economy, as upward price movements in 
the better-off areas are not counter-balanced by deflationary movements in 
poorer areas (Archibald, 1969; Thomas and Stoney, 1971; Jackman et al, 1990; 
Wall and Zoega, 2002).1 Further, they lead to out-migration of the most skilled 
from the poorer regions thus limiting the capital flows to these regions that 
could ameliorate their economic situation and increase their growth potential 
(Faini, 1996 and 1999; Borjas, 1999). This in effect leads to a nation-wide 
retraction of investment, as human and physical resources are used sub-
optimally and allocation efficiency for the whole economy is reduced 
(Richardson, 1971; see also Faini, 2003).  
Besides these efficiency considerations, however, in the context of transition 
the deficiency of regional policy is particularly important due to one of the 
‘stylised’ characteristics of the very transition process, namely the fast and 
stark widening of regional disparities (Petrakos, 1996 and 2001; Wyzan, 1997; 
Milanovic, 1999). Importantly, despite this widening of disparities, in most 
                                                 
1
 This is under the assumption that prices exhibit downward rigidity. Further, price increases in the 
richer areas may even spill over to areas with lower demand pressures thus further intensifying regional 
and national problems of inflation and unemployment.  
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transition countries regional policy gained a momentum only when, and insofar 
as, the external factor (most notably the European Union) put pressure on the 
central administration to place more emphasis on issues of regional 
development and policy (Bachtler et al, 2000; Brusis, 2002; Hughes et al, 2003; 
Enyedi and Tozsa, 2004).  
This paper examines exactly this process of delayed and conditional 
development of regional policy, focusing on the case of Bulgaria, one of the 
latecomers in both processes of transition and European integration. The paper 
first provides a brief review of Bulgaria’s progress with transition and the 
development of its relations with the EU. Section 3 examines the nature, 
history and evolution of regional problems in the country, while section 4 
reviews the development of policy responses to these problems. The analysis of 
the role that the EU played, through conditionality and pre-accession aid, for 
the specific development of regional policy in Bulgaria – and the problems and 
limitations that this has created – is presented in section 5. The last section 
summarises and concludes with some considerations about the direction for the 
future development of regional policy in the country.  
 
2. Bulgarian transition and EU relations 
Bulgaria’s transition has been in many respects particularly painful and 
turbulent. The country entered the transition period with exploding external 
debts and a continuously worsening balance of payments, largely due to its 
extensive integration to the CMEA structures and its status as a satellite Soviet 
economy (Bristow, 1997; Dobrinsky, 2000). When the communist government 
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of Zhivkov lost power in 1989, a prolonged period of political instability (with 
five different Prime Ministers and perhaps twice as many governments between 
1990 and 1994) and of significant economic depression followed. Influenced to 
an extent by IMF and World Bank conditionality2 the country seemed to be 
flirting momentarily with a ‘big-bang’ approach to transition (Spenner et al, 
1998). For example, at the time of securing its first loans from the international 
financing institutions (IMF in February 1991; IBRD in July 1991), Bulgaria 
had already introduced or designed a number of reforms, including legislation 
on Commerce and Competition (both bills adopted in 1991), an aggressive 
liberalisation of prices (EBRD, 1996; Jones and Miller, 1997) and a restrictive 
incomes policy (in the form of wage-growth ceilings; Tzanov and Vaughan-
Whitehead, 1997). Nevertheless, and owing – at least to an extent – to the fact 
that the (reformed) Socialist Party remained in power for much of the early 
1990s and the lack of wider support for critically needed but painful reforms 
(Dimitrov, 1995), soon the country adopted a more gradualist approach to 
transition and reversed some of its earlier aggressive liberalisation policies (for 
example, re-activating the 1988 Decree, with which administrative controls for 
about 50% of consumer prices were introduced and lasted until around 1996). 
The combination of the regression to a gradualist approach to transition with 
the rather turbulent political climate of the early 1990s led to on-and-off 
implementation of reforms and eventually the emergence of excruciating soft 
budget constraints, as the slow pace of large-scale privatisation and 
                                                 
2
 As has been widely discussed in the academic and non-academic literatures (see Stiglitz, 2002), IMF 
and World Bank conditionality entail strong restrictions in the policy options regarding the direction, 
content and pace of reforms for the benefiting countries. Moreover, IMF structural conditions for 
transition countries in particular have been disproportionately skewed towards conditioning on ‘prior 
actions’ rather than ‘structural benchmarks’ and/or ‘performance criteria’ (see IMF, 2001, for a further 
analysis and explanation of these terms), while IBRD conditionality was disproportionately focusing on 
privatisation and (trade/price) liberalisation (Koeberle et al, 2005).  
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restructuring made the option for the state of not bailing-out ailing companies 
particularly costly (Claessens and Peters, 1997; Budina et al, 2000; Everaert 
and Hildebrandt, 2001; Calacean and Aligica, 2004). Under these conditions, 
the Bulgarian economy registered significant rates of decline with employment 
and GDP declining by 30% and 25%, respectively, between 1990 and 1994 and 
unemployment and inflation shooting to above 20% and 100% respectively 
over the same period.  
The country had just started showing some signs of recovery when it was hit by 
a deep financial crisis triggered by huge bank indebtedness and the 
unsustainably high external debt (see Dobrinsky, 2000, for a detailed analysis 
of the causes and characteristics of the 1996/97 crisis). In response to this 
crisis, the newly elected centre-right coalition in 1997 established a Currency 
Board3, pegged the leva to the DM (and later to the Euro), and speeded-up the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), thus managing to control 
inflation and lead the economy to a sustainable path of recovery. Following this 
change of economic and political fortunes, the process of association with the 
EU also intensified. Building on the first Trade Agreement of 1990 and the 
Europe Agreement of 1995, Bulgaria signed an Accession Partnership in 1997 
and opened accession negotiations with the EU in 2000. These were concluded 
in 2004 and in 2005 an Accession Treaty was signed, leading to the accession 
of Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007. The intensification of the process of 
European association – and the continuing inflow of EU funds and international 
aid – helped further the economic recovery, leading to increased inflows of 
FDI, increased trade flows and accelerated privatisation (EBRD, 2003). 
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 The initial steps for the establishment of the Currency Board were in fact taken by the interim 
government of Stefan Sofianski, which was put in place to prepare for the 1997 elections after the 
collapse of the socialist government of Georgi Parvanov.  
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3. Regional problems and performance 
Under this turbulent transition phase, almost naturally, the emphasis placed on 
issues of regional economic performance was limited. At hindsight, this made a 
poor situation worse, arguably contributing to the widening of regional 
disparities and intensifying problems of asymmetry and backwardness for the 
less developed areas of the country.  
In the beginning of transition, as with many other transition economies, 
Bulgaria had only modest regional imbalances, at least in terms of standards of 
living (Naidenova, 1983; although, admittedly, regional structures and 
potentials were noticeably disparate – Hoffman, 1972; Donchev, 1983). 
Unemployment was hardly an issue in the pre-transition era (although labour 
hoarding and hidden unemployment were not), while for the largest part 
incomes and prices were determined by the central administration in a more or 
less equitable way. The main regional issues in the pre-transition period had to 
do with patterns of depopulation of rural areas and environmental degradation 
but, in line with the ideology of economic macro-management by the State, 
these issues were dealt with in ad hoc but clearly redistributive, if socially 
challenging, ways (Paskaleva, 1990; Jackson, 1991). The fiscal crisis of the late 
1980s actually intensified some of these problems, strengthening further the 
patterns of urbanisation and over-concentration in Sofia and linking more 
closely the performance of the regions to that of the key SOEs (Begg and 
Pickles, 1998). Although immediately after the fall of communism regional 
disparities initially declined (as rich regions were most affected by the 
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transition shock),4 regional disparities started widening notably by 1993 and 
problems of depopulation and unemployment intensified for the less prosperous 
areas.5  
In the second phase of transition (post-1997) the economic take-off nationally 
favoured particularly the main urban areas (Sofia, Strata-Zagora, Burgas, 
Varna) and led to further increases in regional inequalities – and the emergence 
of notable intra-regional disparities (Sklavounos, 2002; Marinov and 
Malhassian, 2003; MRDPW, 2005). This was not unrelated to the specific 
spatial patterns in the geographical allocation of physical and human capital in 
the country or indeed the patterns of structural change of its regions. On the one 
hand, continuing trends of internal migration intensified the over-concentration 
of high-skill / high-education workers in the Capital and its wider NUTS-2 
region (where, in 2001, the population share of university graduates was about 
double that of the rest of the country). Perhaps not unexpectedly so did foreign 
direct investment (with about 60% of total FDI stock by 2004 being 
concentrated in the South West region, which in per capita terms had attracted 
up to ten times more cumulative FDI flows than the South Central region – the 
second, in absolute terms, FDI location) (MRDPW, 2005; Monastiriotis and 
Alegria, 2008). On the other hand, following the slow progress more generally 
with transition, industrial restructuring and production diversification at the 
regional level were particularly slow, with little evidence of restructuring until 
                                                 
4
 Minassian and Totev (1996) report a practical collapse of industrial production in the two main cities 
of Sofia and Burgas between 1989 and 1991 (Table 8 in their paper), which can partly explain the 
strong narrowing of regional disparities between the two years, with Sofia and Burgas losing around 
20% and over 40% respectively of their income advantage relative to the country (Table 7).  
5
 Whether or not this evolution reflects the impact of yet another ‘invisible’ market mechanism, either 
in the form of an ‘empirical regularity’ tied to the process of transition (Petrakos, 2001; Hapiot and 
Slim, 2004) or through a more theoretically grounded mechanism linked to the process of development 
(in line with a regional Kuznets curve – see Williamson, 1965), is in a sense an empirical issue, which 
goes beyond the immediate interest of this paper (for a more focused discussion of this see 
Monastiriotis, 2007).  
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1996 and with most of restructuring being backward (i.e., towards agriculture) 
with the exception of Sofia that took on the function of a ‘service centre’ 
(Totev, 2004). Petrakos et al (2005) also report very low Coefficients of 
Structural Change for the Bulgarian districts until 1999 and an increasing 
dissimilarity to the EU-15 average.   
Owing to such developments, by the turn of the century Bulgaria’s regional and 
spatial problems exhibited a combination of characteristics of polarisation, 
peripheral backwardness, spatial un-connectedness and localised (sub-regional) 
inequality. These characteristics are rather clearly depicted in the spatial 
patterns of inequality in terms of regional incomes in the country.6 First is the 
emerging dichotomy of development paths, at least since the mid-1990s, 
between the most dynamic urban regions and the rest of the country. Between 
1995 and 2002 district-level growth rates varied in real terms between less than 
1% (in Sliven, Dobrich, Kardjali, Haskovo and Pazardjik) and above 6% per 
annum (in Vratsa, Silistra, Sofia, Burgas, Gabrovo and Smoljan). Although 
there is little, if any, evidence to suggest continuing beta-divergence nationally7 
(at least at the NUTS-3 / district level – Petrakos, 2001; Marinov and 
Malhassian, 2003; Monastiriotis, 2006 and 2007), at closer inspection two 
interesting patterns are evident. On the one hand, outside the top-five districts 
in terms of GDP per capita, inter-district disparities have been reasonably low 
and increased only marginally since 1995, while the ranking of districts in 
terms of GDP per capita has been rather volatile, suggesting limited persistence 
                                                 
6
 The description of these patterns in this section draws heavily on Monastiriotis (2008).  
7
 Beta-convergence (or divergence) shows the speed at which the poorest regions catch-up with 
(diverge from) the most well-off regions, by examining the extent to which the former experience 
higher rates of growth compared to the latter. In that, it does not capture evolutions in the overall extent 
of disparity, as slower growth in the richest regions (beta-convergence) can well imply a widening of 
absolute differences in per capita incomes.  
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of disparities at this level. On the other hand, disparities for the whole of the 
country, including the top-five districts, have been widening rather fast, almost 
doubling since 1998, suggesting a clear pattern of polarisation between the 
most dynamic regions and the rest of the country.  
Second, a result of this polarisation has been the strengthening of the primacy 
of Sofia (and few other main urban areas) in the Bulgarian economy. 
According to Eurostat data, GDP per capita in the Capital is in real terms up to 
three times higher than that of the poorest region (Kardjali at the South Central 
region). At lower levels of spatial aggregation (NUTS-4 / municipalities), these 
differences are much more emphatic, reaching over tenfold differences between 
the richest (Radnevo in the Strata-Zagora District or Chelopech in Sofia) and 
poorest (Satovcha in the Blagoevgrad District in SW and Ruen in the District of 
Burgas in SE) municipalities (UNDP, 2002).8 Third, beyond this polarisation, 
importantly patterns of spatial inequality are rather localised. Disparities across 
NUTS-2 regions are very low by international / European standards 
(Spiridonova, 2002) and while disparities across NUTS-3 areas are much more 
notable (Petrakos, 2001; Totev, 2004), around 75% of disparities are intra-
NUTS3 (UNDP, 2002; MRDPW, 2005), with almost every top-5 district 
(NUTS-3) having at least one bottom-10% municipality (NUTS-4).9 Clustering 
of low-income municipalities does exist (especially in the North-West and in 
                                                 
8
 Spiridonova and Grigorov (2000) refer to uncited studies that ‘report differences of over 100 times in 
the values of production output’, even excluding Sofia, for the early/mid-1990s (p.78). Differences in 
unemployment and activity rates are also very wide, ranging even at the very aggregate (NUTS-2) level 
between 13% and 27% (data for 2002; Dimitrova and Sirak, 2005).  
9
 Own calculations from the Data Tables in Annex 2 of UNDP (2002). In this sense, it would appear 
that the optimal level for the design and delivery of regional policy in Bulgaria would be the District 
level (NUTS-3). However, as we discuss later, this was not possible and, in reality, has never been 
considered, as the EU architecture does not envisage NUTS-3 regions as policy-making units. Instead, 
Bulgaria moved on to weaken the role of Districts in regional policy, by decentralising the initiation of 
policy proposals to the municipality (NUTS-4) level and centralising the financing and delivery 
functions to the central and macro-regional (NUTS-2) levels.  
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parts of the south and east but outside the main cities), but it rarely translates 
into a macro-geography, i.e., into one that would identify the main economic 
disparities with existing higher-level administrative divisions (MRDPW, 2005; 
Monastiriotis, 2008).  
Finally, besides these patterns of regional and sub-regional inequality, one of 
the main problems for regional and national development in Bulgaria appears 
to be related to the very weak and heterogeneous spatial connectivity of its 
local economies. The dimensions of this characteristic have only recently been 
identified (both in policy circles and in the academia), mainly through the 
realisation of the role that upgrading the transport infrastructure can play for 
the intensification of economic links between localities – and some targeted 
policy innovations in this direction are currently being implemented.10 
Importantly, however, the lack of economic connectivity across space, which is 
also evidenced in the weak association of economic outcomes across 
neighbouring areas (Monastiriotis, 2008), appears to mask two very opposite 
trends: a pattern of absorption or competition between the main urban centres 
and their hinterlands (evidenced as strong localised negative dependence for 
cities11) and some evidence of locational path-dependence (spatial 
heterogeneity) and localised clustering outside these centres (evidenced as 
strong localised positive dependence outside the main urban areas which turns 
negative at very long distances).  
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 For example, with the setting of ‘Local and Regional Connectivity’ as one of the five main Priority 
Areas of the 2007/13 Operation Programme for Regional Development (MRDPW, 2005). 
11
 The term spatial dependence is used in the spatial statistics literature (see Anselin, 1988) to describe 
the degree of (statistical) association between local and neighbouring outcomes. The notion of distance 
indicates the scale at which a neighbourhood is defined, e.g., from immediate contiguity (‘short’ 
distance) to a distance threshold that includes more areas than the immediate neighbours (‘long’ 
distance). Spatial heterogeneity is a concept describing the fragmentation of economic space into 
different ‘regimes’, e.g., cases of North-South divisions or of urban-rural dichotomies.  
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In a sense, then, the nature of the regional problem of Bulgaria has largely 
remained qualitatively the same, but intensified, throughout the transition 
period. The only exception to that is perhaps the disconnection of the regional 
economies from the large SOEs that they used to host, at least in those cases 
where reconstruction and privatisation have been relatively successful 
(Spiridonova and Grigorov, 2000) and a diversified pool of foreign direct 
investments have flown in (Carter, 2005; Totev, 2005) – although much of this 
disconnection happened through disinvestment and downsizing, especially in 
the first half of the 1990s (Begg and Pickles, 1998; Staddon, 2005).12 But 
besides this, the main regional problems for Bulgaria are today, as they have 
been for over two decades, (i) the primacy of few urban areas; (ii) the rather 
localised spatial economic disparities; and (iii) the weak economic links 
between the regional and local economies. 
 
4. The development of regional policy 
Despite the fact that under central planning regional policy obtained naturally a 
secondary role, some elements of regional policy can be clearly identified in 
the pre-transition period. The first attempts for such policy date back to the 
early 1960s, when a policy of relocation of industry to small- and medium-
sized towns in the periphery of the country was initiated, aiming at addressing 
issues of peripheral backwardness and counteracting the strong urbanisation 
trends and resulting housing shortages. In the following years district-level 
planning committees were created and in 1970 the State Planning Committee, 
                                                 
12
 Another facet of this disconnection is captured by Totev (2004) who identifies a structural shift from 
enterprises influencing local economic performance (until around 1996) to enterprise performance 
becoming dependant ‘mainly [on] the general economic performance of the districts’ (p.5). 
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which was responsible for the annual economic development plans, obtained a 
General Directorate for the Territorial Location of Production Forces, which 
was responsible for the ‘spatial dispersion of productive forces’ (Hoffman, 
1972, p.203). These developments succeeded in bringing closer together central 
planning with regional and local (district-level) needs, but in economic terms 
they were not particularly successful, or sustainable, not least because of the 
inherent conflict between the requirements of regional planning and the 
emphasis that the ideology of central planning places on specialisation, 
concentration and vertical integration of production units (Paskaleva, 1990). 
Following the reversal of the trend of declining spatial disparities in the 1980s 
(Naidenova, 1983), a reform of regional administration was undertaken in 
1987, which abolished the intermediate tier (okurg) with the aggregation of the 
28 districts into nine regions. This constituted a first step towards local 
empowerment, as it gave more administrative power to the municipalities 
(Paskaleva, 1990; Kapitanova and Minis, 2003), but its main effect was the real 
empowerment of the central administration through the ‘thinning of vertical 
structures’ across different levels of administration (Dimitrov, 1995, p.27).13  
After the collapse of communism, the new governments continued with this 
approach of mixed decentralisation, empowering further the municipal 
administrations (through the 1991 Local Self-Governance Act) but also not 
addressing the issue of weakened regional representation at the centre.14 
Besides these administrative changes, in the early transition period the size and 
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 This aggregation served in fact an additional role, namely to dissolve the presence of ethnic minority 
groups within administrative authorities and thus to pre-emptively cancel any potential secessionist 
attempts, especially by the Turkish minority in the South East (Dimitrov, 1995; Pickles, 2001).  
14
 In fact the post-communist governments only restored the original administrative geography in 1999, 
under the general restructuring of sub-national administration structures in the advent of Bulgaria’s 
accession negotiations with the EU.  
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scope of regional policy was notably limited, its response to the problems of 
polarisation and spatial un-connectedness highlighted above was at best slow 
and fragmented, and its objectives were largely vague and abstract (Marinov 
and Malhassian, 2003). The 1990 Constitution of Bulgaria mentions the 
objective of ‘balanced regional growth’ as a responsibility of the State, but 
neither this or any subsequent legislation introduced any specific formal 
institutional structures to implement policies. An inherent conflict between the 
need for central control and for regional autonomy is evident in the early 
reforms (Kapitanova and Minis, 2003) while the political and financial 
instability experienced in this period delayed significantly the development of 
specific regional policies (Minassian and Totev, 1996; Kamenova, 1999).  
In fact, until 1996 regional policy was largely conducted at an ad hoc basis, 
mainly through a number of subsidies for local-level interventions targeting 
mainly projects on transport, environment, and employment (Kamenova, 
1999). Following the model of municipal self-governance, these interventions 
were initiated by the municipalities and financed directly by the State Budget, 
but without a clear design of regional allocation formula and, importantly, 
without regional identification of the allocation of funds.15 This interaction of 
localised planning and lack of central design meant that the few projects that 
were undertaken failed to account for inter-regional imbalances and the wider 
spatial development needs of the country. At the same time, even nationally, 
public investment was particularly low (less than 2% of GDP or around 4% of 
total government expenditure – Monastiriotis, 2008), while the limited foreign 
investments were heavily concentrating in a few better-off regions (Carter, 
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 Private communication with policy officials at the Statistics department of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Finance (March, 2006) 
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2005), especially given the absence of any incentives policy (e.g., tax 
exemptions) in this period. The ad hoc nature of regional development 
initiatives during this period was perhaps reinforced by the fact that the 
allocation of EU aid (under PHARE) was mainly directed towards border 
regions (cross-border cooperation) – which were not necessarily the ones of 
most acute need (Illes, 2004).16  
In the mid-to-late 1990s some firmer attempts where made, both within and 
outside the central administration (NCRDHP, 1995; MRDC, 1996), to measure 
the extent and nature of regional disparities in the country and provide some 
prescriptions for policy – but largely these attempts remained at the level of 
identification of sub-national developmental needs and development of general 
policy proposals and did not translate into specific action plans.17 Area 
designation only took some tangible form post-1997 (i.e., after the 1996/97 
financial crisis and the irrevocable commitment to a path of ‘Europeanisation’ 
as a response to it), with the introduction of a system of regional incentives (tax 
exemptions for investments in ‘depressed areas’) through the Corporate 
Incomes Tax Acts.18 But this policy was under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance (both for the specification of the incentives and for area 
designation) and thus did not form part of standard regional policy (which was 
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 The 1997 and 1998 PHARE programmes focused specifically on dealing with emergency relief 
under the Emergency Social Assistance Programme, which was exclusively of a horizontal character. 
Other sources of international assistance (EIB, IMF, EBRD) were also either targeting horizontal 
interventions (EIB, 2006; EBRD, 2006) or implicitly favouring local authorities with above-average 
financial and administrative capacities (UNDP, 2004).  
17
 The 1996 Ministry for Regional Development and Construction publication moved slightly further, 
to identifying specific priority areas (mainly mountainous/disadvantaged and depressed/peripheral 
regions), but this did not seem to inform or influence relatively contemporaneous legislative 
developments (e.g., the Administrative and Territorial Organisation Act of 1995).  
18
 The first such Act was introduced in 1997 (effective from 1998) and has been amended annually 
since. Presently the designed incentives provide up to 100% tax exemption from the Corporate Income 
Tax (standing at 15% since 2005 and down to 10% for some tax categories under the October 2006 
Act) and cover municipalities with unemployment at least 1.5 times above the national average. Some 
further progress was also made with the 1998 amendment of the 1995 Administrative Act.  
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the responsibility of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works). 
It was further ‘significantly hampered by the fact that [most regions] feature a 
combination of structural problems’, including problems of decline, structural 
imbalances and human capital shortages (Spiridonova and Grigorov, 2000, 
p.79).  
It was only at the turn of the century that a dramatic change in Bulgarian 
regional policy occurred. With the dynamic generated by the strengthening of 
Bulgaria’s European perspective (see discussion in section 5) the first Regional 
Development Act was adopted in 1999 and, with it, a new approach to regional 
policy emerged, with the introduction of important changes in the regional 
administrative structure, the institutions of regional policy, and the planning of 
regional interventions.  
First, the Act introduced in the country the European classification of 
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) and four NUTS-level tiers were 
established.19 Second, the new policy legislation created a thick (and 
complicated) institutional administrative structure that assumed responsibility 
of regional policy in the country.20 Overall responsibility for regional and 
development policy was shared between the Council of Ministers (CoM) and 
the Ministry for Regional Development and Public Works (MRDPW). The 
CoM had the responsibility for adopting the National Economic Development 
Plan (NEDP) and, within this, the National Regional Development Plan 
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 In fact the 1999 Act did not provide for NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 tiers; these were created a year later 
under a special Council of Ministers Decree (No145). As is discussed later, these developments were 
significantly influenced, if not motivated, by the need to accommodate specific Eurostat requirements 
and satisfy aspects of EU conditionality (Brusis, 2002). The designation of NUTS-2 regions changed 
again in 2006, to deal with the inconsistency between the local and Eurostat definitions.  
20
 The description of this structure is based on MRDPW (2001). Some further developments in the 
institutions of regional policy in the country have occurred since, but they have not altered the main 
structure described here (see SIGMA, 2005; Primatarova and Ganev, 2008).  
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(NRDP), which defined assisted areas and areas of priority. The MRDPW 
(which, of course, was also represented in the CoM) was responsible for the 
preparation of the NEDP and NRDP and the design and implementation of 
regional policy.21 Two specialist bodies were established within these 
organisations: the Regional Coordination Directorate (within the CoM) took the 
responsibility of coordinating actions between central, regional and municipal 
authorities; while the Central Coordination Unit (within the MRDPW) was to 
oversee the implementation of policy at the regional and sub-regional levels. At 
the lower level (but still under the CoM) a Council for Regional Development 
was established (with participation of a number of Ministries, District 
Governors and representatives from the National Association of 
Municipalities), which was responsible for developing policy proposals under 
the NRDP and for coordinating implementation of regional policies. This had a 
vertical structure, with Regional Development Councils created in each of the 
six newly-created NUTS-2 macro-regions; 28 district-level Councils for 
Regional Development (responsible for designing and implementing the district 
development programmes); and a Development Office or Directorate in each of 
Bulgaria’s 264 Municipal Councils (where responsibility was mainly on 
initiating policy proposals and designing policies through participation at more 
central levels).22 Finally, a Commission for Economic and Social Cohesion was 
also established (with six offices, one in each macro-region), with participation 
from all stakeholders (including central and district government officials as 
                                                 
21
 Financing and management of governmental and EU funds was, and still is, under the responsibility 
of the Minsitry of Finance.  
22
 Characteristically, a special Directorate has only been possible to be created in about 50 
municipalities (which were, incidentally, the largest). About a hundred of medium-size municipalities 
have instead established a Unit within an existing Directorate, while the bottom 45% of municipalities 
have only created a one-person Office (Primatarova and Ganev, 2008). 
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well as NGOs and employee and employer associations)23 and with a more 
consultative role but also some shared responsibilities with regards to policy 
implementation.  
Third, the institutional changes of the 1999 Act also allowed a more integrated 
policy approach to emerge, and policy emphasis to shift from ad hoc 
redistribution to enhancing administrative capacities at the regional and local 
levels. Following, the first integrated national regional programmes were 
developed, initiating the first Operational Programme for Regional 
Development (OPRD) in 2000 (within the 2000/06 NRDP of the National 
Economic Development Plan). Despite this significant policy innovation, some 
inherent inconsistencies in the new regional policy design hampered 
significantly the effectiveness of regional interventions. The OPRD was 
designed on the basis of planning regions (NUTS-2 and to a lesser extent 
NUTS-3), which were ‘the basis for the programming of pre-accession funding 
and later on of the Structural Funds’ (Totev, 2004, p.10). At the same time, the 
NRDP introduced a parallel spatial division, with explicit designation of ‘areas 
of purposeful intervention’ (areas for growth; areas for development; areas of 
industrial decline; backward rural areas; areas for cross-border cooperation), 
which covered around three quarters of the total population of the country 
(Totev, 2004). Designation of these areas was at the municipal level, since it 
was at that level that problems and differences in performance could be 
identified (Marinov and Malhassian, 2003). This led to a rather mixed top-
down and bottom-up approach, with programmes proposed and initiated by 
municipalities, but with allocation of resources being on the basis of NUTS-2 
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 Two of the most relevant NGOs in this context were the National Association of Municipalities in 
the Republic of Bulgaria (NAMRB) and the Bulgarian Association of Regional Development Agencies 
(BARDA), which also have representation at the Council for Regional Development.  
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regions (not municipalities), which, incidentally, did not obtain a governance 
structure but remained largely statistical divisions.24  
Moreover, area designation under the NRDP was largely directed towards 
serving national objectives. More than half of the available funds was allocated 
to the ‘areas for growth’ (identified as dynamic areas that can stimulate 
national growth) while the rural, declining and developing areas together 
received less than a quarter of the funds (around 64% of the funding that was 
directed to the ‘areas for growth’ in per capita terms) (Totev, 2004). Naturally, 
this tended to reinforce regional disparities in the country. The prioritising of 
national objectives and interventions is also evident in the allocation of funds 
under the OPRD (i.e., for regionally targeted interventions under PHARE co-
financing). As is depicted in Figure 1, the main element of regionally 
identifiable expenditure under the first OPRD was the PHARE funds (with 
around half of PHARE spending directed to regional interventions) while the 
regionally identifiable element of domestic financing was a mere 6.3% of total 
domestic expenditures under NEDP. The implication of this was that, even in 
relative terms, within the limited budget of the NEDP, the total level of 
spending on regionally identifiable interventions in the OPRD was particularly 
low, with total funds allocated to the OPRD constituting less that 8% of total 
NEDP spending in the period 2003/06 – or less than a mere 1% of GDP (see 
Table 1).25 Thus, as domestic resources were disproportionately directed 
towards national programmes, the first OPRD had only a limited impact on 
                                                 
24
 It is worth mentioning that while the central (NUTS-1) and municipal (NUTS-4) levels are 
autonomous (self-governed), in the two intermediate tiers officials are directly appointed by the State 
and their function is merely to promote the policies of the central authority. 
25
 Of this, domestic financing accounted for 25% of total OPRD commitments, with 13.5% coming 
from the Central Government Budget, 1.5% from the Municipal Budgets and 10% from the private 
sector. 
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addressing regional development problems and the process of regional 
convergence was significantly compromised.  
Figure 1. Regional development expenditures under OPRD by source  
 
Notes: Designated expenditures under the 2003-2006 Regional Operational Programme, expressed as 
shares, for each corresponding category, of total designated spending under the 2003-2006 National 
Economic Development Programme. BG includes funding from the Central Government Budget 
(13.5%), the Municipal Budgets (1.5%), and the private sector (10%) (the remaining 75% is provided 
by PHARE funds). EU includes regional spending under PHARE (46% of all PHARE spending) as a 
share of all EU-financed expenditures (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD). 
 
An implication of these deficiencies was that even the limited amount of 
resources allocated to regional development had only a weakly redistributive 
character. The allocation of OPRD funds to the six macro-regions26 ranged 
between €8.80 per capita in South West and €33.40 per capita in North West or 
between 0.3% and 1.8% of regional GDPs, respectively. The South West 
region, which includes Sofia and is by far the richest region in the country, 
received the fewest funds in relative terms (but not in absolute terms, due to its 
large population size) – around 13.7% of the total (for about 27% of total 
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 Comprehensive data for lower spatial levels are not readily available.  
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population). Overall, the redistributive capacity of OPRD (measured in both 
absolute and relative terms) appears particularly high when the South West 
region is included (correlation between spending and regional incomes is 
between -0.71 and -0.82). However, outside the capital region regional 
spending under the 2000/06 OPRD was in fact strictly counter-redistributive.  
Table 1. Regional allocation and redistributive capacity of OPRD funds 
GDP ROP NUTS Region Population (th) (pc, €) (€m) (€m) (pc, €) (% GDP) 
BG11 North West 527 1,866 983 17.6 33.4 1.79 
BG12 North Central 1,187 1,826 2,166 24.0 20.2 1.11 
BG13 North East 1,299 1,777 2,308 32.0 24.7 1.39 
BG21 South West 2,103 3,054 6,421 18.6 8.8 0.29 
BG22 South Central 1,963 1,701 3,339 36.1 18.4 1.08 
BG23 South East 791 1,734 1,372 18.3 23.1 1.33 
BG – Bulgaria  7,868 2,108 16,589 146.6 18.6 0.88 
Correlations All regions Excluding SW (Sofia) 
r(ROP pc, GDP pc) -0.707 0.717 
r(ROP/GDP, GDP pc) -0.816 0.636 
Note: Own calculations from MRDPW, Ministry of Finance and Eurostat data. Data refer to committed 
expenditures for 2003 under the Economic and Social Cohesion leg of PHARE (including national 
contributions).  
 
As is depicted in Table 1 (data are for 2003 only, but are indicative of the 
general allocation formula), regional spending followed strongly the 
distribution of regional incomes in the other five Bulgarian macro-regions 
(correlation coefficients between 0.64 and 0.72). To an extent this simply 
shows that the typical emphasis of PHARE on border regions is not in itself 
necessarily redistributive. However, more importantly, the evidence of 
regressive redistribution outside South West effectively reflects two more 
subtle characteristics: on the one hand, the limitations of the regional policy 
design under the first OPRD that tended to favour the more ‘absorptive’ and/or 
more resourceful municipalities and districts; on the other, the fact that the 
architecture of the administration and the design of regional policy in Bulgaria 
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seemed to prioritise on national objectives and to lack a targeted redistributive 
character.  
Overall, then, even at this period of strong policy development, policy design 
and implementation was problematic. Some elements of over-commitment to 
EU-like structures (e.g., the design of policies at the NUTS-2 level), combined 
with a notably thick and complex institutional architecture, poor national 
finances to support an effective regional policy, and an emphasis on national 
growth over the aim of tackling disparities, meant that regional policy failed to 
address the main regional problems of the country, particularly those relating to 
backwardness, polarisation, and spatial un-connectedness.27 More recently, 
following some further legislation (2001 Spatial Planning Act, 2003 Territorial 
Organisation Act, 2004 Regional Development Act) and the conclusion of 
Bulgaria’s EU accession negotiations in 2004, Bulgaria’s regional policy has 
developed further and a new National Strategy for Regional Development (for 
2005/10) and new Operational Programme for Regional Development (under 
the 2007/13 National Strategic Reference framework) have been produced 
(MRDPW, 2005) – although the operationalisation of these encountered 
prolonged problems and was only approved by the European Commission just 
a few months before Bulgaria’s accession to the EU (NSRF, 2007). The new 
OPRD is managed by a central Managing Authority (a DG within the Ministry 
of Regional Development) assisted by six Regional Implementing Bodies, 
which however have only an implementation role, reflecting again the 
centralised character of the design of regional policy in the country. 
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 In the own words of the policy-makers of the MRDPW, the first NRDP/OPRD ‘has established a 
system of non-coordinated, frequently overlapping and inefficient planning documents, failing to 
comply with the requirements for the form and content of such documents in the acquis’ (quotation 
given in Minkova, 2004, p.25). See Minkova (2004) for a more detailed discussion of the deficiencies 
of the first NRDP/OPRD.  
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Nevertheless, the new OPRD also introduces a number of policy innovations 
for Bulgaria, including its emphasis on polycentricism (identifying areas of 
agglomeration and their hinterlands), its adherence to a number of EU 
frameworks (Community Strategic Guidelines, Cohesion Policy in Support of 
Growth and Jobs, European Spatial Development Perspective), and its 
‘European’ structure – which identifies specific thematic priority areas for 
intervention. Interestingly, the new NRDP explicitly introduces a new objective 
for regional policy, defined as the ‘elimination of regional discrepancies’ (CM, 
2005, p.1) – but this objective is not to be found in either the draft or the final 
document of the 2007/13 OPRD (MRDPW, 2005; NSRF, 2007), which still 
emphasises the objective of balanced and sustainable regional development.28  
We discuss these aspects in detail in the following section, where our emphasis 
shifts from the conduct of Bulgarian regional policy to the role that the EU, 
through its own regional policy, its accession conditionality and its instruments 
of financial aid and development, has exerted on regional policy formation in 
the country. 
 
5. Discussion: developing regional policy and the role of the EU 
It is clear from the review of the development of regional policy in Bulgaria 
that this can be rather easily divided into four sub-periods: the late central 
planning period, where some territorial policies were incorporated in the wider 
planning of sectoral and industrial policies; the transition period, where policy 
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 Also characteristic is the fact that Bulgaria opted for a single centralised OPRD for the Programming 
Period 2007-2013, which is seen as a transitory phase before the next programming period when it is 
envisaged that the country will adopt six regional OPRD (one for each NUTS-2 region).  
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developments were slow and largely dictated by national needs and internal 
constraints; the accession period, where the role of the EU became more central 
and policy design and implementation started becoming ‘Europeanised’29; and 
the post-accession period, where regional policy obtains a clear European form 
and structure. However, it is also rather clear that throughout these phases of 
policy development, regional policy has largely failed to tackle regional and 
sub-regional disparities in the country and, more specifically, to address the 
particular spatial problems of the sub-national economies (unconnectedness, 
polarisation, backwardness, decline). Although the focus of this paper is largely 
on the role of the EU in shaping Bulgarian regional policy, it is of course 
important to examine the range of factors that have conditioned the 
development of Bulgaria’s regional policy and the ways in which regional 
policy responded to the influences exerted by the EU. 
Internal limitations seem to have played a significant role in delaying the 
designing and deployment of regional policy in Bulgaria. These limitations 
encompass all institutional, economic and policy spheres. As with most 
transition economies (or perhaps even more, because of its tighter links to the 
Soviet model – Bristow, 1997), Bulgaria emerged from the central-planning 
period with very little experience of conducting regional policy and very weak 
sub-national administrative capacities. The combination of this inexperience 
with the abolition of the regional tier in the early transition period intensified 
local antagonisms (Brusis, 2002; Minkova, 2004) and transmitted the 
developing culture of corruption and clientelism to the domain of regional 
policy (Jones and Miller, 1997). Owing partly to the clinging of the former 
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 The term ‘Europeanisation’ is used here with some caution. In reality, regional policy development 
reflects less a process of adaptation to EU processes and more a simple downloading of policies and 
processes (Hughes et al, 2001; Brusis, 2002).  
  24 
Communist Party to power, the early transition period was characterised by 
slow and ineffective transition reforms, while restructuring and privatisation 
were also delayed, leading to the emergence of significant soft budget 
constraints (Claessens and Peters, 1997; Calacean and Aligica, 2004). The 
inefficient and distorted structure of production in fact intensified the 
emergence of soft budget constraints and of course made the application of 
effective restructuring policies more problematic (Begg and Pickles, 1998). 
Following, economic performance during the early transition period was dismal 
and came to add to the significant transition shock that the economy 
experienced in 1990-1992 (Minassian and Totev, 1996; Dobrinsky, 2000). 
Among other effects that this had, were the limited availability of resources for 
regional and development policies (which hindered further the development of 
a comprehensive regional policy design) and the natural prioritising of national 
growth over regional development and convergence (Marinov and Malhassian, 
2003). This in turn led to further regional imbalances (for example, as foreign 
investment was disproportionately directed to the most advanced areas – 
Carter, 2005; Totev, 2005) and thus intensified the already complex regional 
problem of the country.  
Besides these factors, a number of external influences played a role in delaying 
the development of a comprehensive regional policy during the early transition 
period. The initial involvement of IMF and the World Bank in the setting of the 
restructuring and transition policies and objectives in the country led to the 
prioritising of stabilisation, market liberalisation and loan repayment over the 
implementation of regional and cohesion policies, which are largely seen by 
these international organisations as distortionary (Koeberle et al, 2005). 
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Further, as has been argued earlier, the financial support from these and other 
international organisations tended to favour horizontal or spatially fragmented 
projects and thus was not conducive to the development of a robust framework 
for national regional policy (UNDP, 2004; EIB, 2006). The involvement of the 
international private sector was not sufficient to counter-act these imbalances 
and fill the policy vacuum. Under the implicit (but very real) competition with 
the more attractive economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the FDI flows 
directed to Bulgaria were limited (Totev, 2005; Demekas et al, 2005) and, of 
those that came into the country, the ones that were not concentrating in the 
main cities were mainly of regional character (mainly from Greece) and of low 
technological content (Labrianidis, 2001). The localised character of FDI and 
its low quality and size also implied that its economic impact, in terms of both 
localised sectoral spillovers and wider spatial diffusion effects, were also 
limited, further hindering the developmental potential of the country’s 
backward regions and limiting the ability of (regional) policy to exploit 
functional and technological spillovers (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2008). The 
situation was not helped by the developments in former Yugoslavia, where the 
wars, embargoes and regional instability not only impacted adversely on the 
internationalisation of the Bulgarian economy (Gechev, 2008) but, importantly, 
hit asymmetrically particular regions of the country (in the North West; AEBR, 
2003).  
Within this context, the role of the European Union in this early transition 
period was characteristically limited. In fact, until the Accession Partnership 
agreement of 1997 the EU put little, if any, pressure on Bulgaria to develop any 
regional policy, let alone a coherent policy framework that would adhere to one 
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extent or another to the EU standards.30 The EU gave access to PHARE funds 
as early as 1990/91, but financial flows through PHARE only took off after 
1994 with Commission Regulation No1628/94 (see Table 2). The early EU 
interventions put emphasis (through PHARE) on emergency assistance (to 
address the acute problems generated by the 1996/97 crisis) and cross-border 
cooperation (thus favouring border areas, irrespective of the extent of their 
regional problems vis-à-vis other backward areas in the country; Illes, 2004). 
Later, assistance from the EU (through both PHARE and ISPA) was mainly 
directed towards institution- and capacity-building as a means to assist the 
accession process (Hughes et al, 2001), thus undermining the more urgent 
needs for supporting and integrating the regional and local economies that 
suffered the most. Both of these factors meant that the early interventions were 
rarely matching the true local needs and priorities.  
Table 2. EU aid to Bulgaria, by category and year/period, 1991-2007/9 
PHARE Year 
Total CBC ESC 
Nuclear ISPA SAPARD EIB Total 
1991/98 750 * * - - - 500 1,250 
1999 150 * * - - - 100 250 
2000 150 * * 40 104 53 160 507 
2001 150 * * 40 107 54 130 481 
2002 150 * * 40 111 56 87 444 
2003 123 * * 40 113 57 60 393 
2004 173 28 95 60 135 68 40 476 
2005 175 36 137 60 135 68 30 468 
2006 175 40 135 60 135 68 30 468 
1991 – 1994 300E * * - - - 200 E 500 E 
1995 – 1998 450 E * * - - - 300 E 750 E 
1999 – 2002 600 * * 120 322 163 477 1,682 
2003 – 2006 523 * * 180 405 204 100 1,412 
1991 – 2006 1,996 * * 340 840 424 1,137 4,737 
2007 – 2013# - - - - - - - 6,674C 
Notes: author calculations from various EC sources. E: estimates; C: funds committed; *: information 
not available; #: total allocation of EU funds under the 2007-13 NSRF, excluding national participation 
(of which, 1,361m€ will be channelled through the OPRD).  
 
                                                 
30
 Brusis (2002) argues that this can be partly explained by the fact that a specific and unified 
framework for national regional policy is missing from the EU ‘acquis’ – although the emphasis from 
both the EU and the transition countries on political and economic transition (i.e., prioritising of other 
policy areas) is perhaps an equally strong, if not stronger, explanation. 
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Despite that, two positive developments in this period should perhaps be 
emphasised. On the one hand, the financial and institutional support of PHARE 
actually allowed the creation of a number of independent sub-national 
institutions, most notably the Regional Development Agencies that took an 
important role in the design and implementation of regional policy in the 
country. On the other, the adherence to the ‘European perspective’ helped to 
‘re-legitimi[se] concepts like “strategic planning” that were stigmatised as 
“obsolete” during the first years after 1989’ (Dimitrova and Sirak, 2005, p.61) 
and thus made the design and implementation of national plans for regional and 
national development in later years more acceptable and less problematic. 
Following the Accession Partnership, the European Commission started 
publishing its annual Regular Reports on the state of transition in Bulgaria and 
its progress with accession. With these, the role of the EU in shaping Bulgarian 
regional policy changed notably. In 1998 the EC asked explicitly Bulgaria 
(along with the Czech Republic and Slovakia – Brusis, 2002) to develop the 
‘administrative framework and budgetary procedures for regional policy’ (p.34) 
that would be compatible with the EU requirements regarding the allocation 
and absorption of PHARE and, later, CSF funds (EC, 1998). A complementary 
but significant role was played by Eurostat, which required –for statistical and 
monitoring purposes– the development of a territorial-administrative structure 
compatible with the European classification of Territorial Units for Statistics 
(NUTS) – most emphatically represented in the communications that led to the 
2000 Decree that amended the 1999 Act, which initially did not provide for the 
establishment of NUTS-1 areas in the country. Nevertheless, although the EU 
continued to influence the formulation of regional policy in the country through 
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the European Commission’s Regular Reports, besides requirements in the field 
of regional administrative divisions, the EC recommendations were largely 
vague and consisted mainly of describing the existing policy framework, thus 
only implicitly hinting towards the actions that should be taken (Brusis, 
2002).31 
In this context, the Bulgarian authorities (as with all other accession countries) 
were encouraged to develop a(ny) framework for regional policy. But the lack 
of specific conditions and guidelines (combined with firmer conditions in other 
policy areas and the weak tradition of regional policy domestically) meant that 
the response of the ‘policy receivers’ was a rather mechanical adoption of the 
EU regional policy framework (seen mainly as an administrative task of book-
copying – Hughes et al, 2001). Bulgaria introduced its first Regional 
Development Act in 1999 and, through this, its first National and Regional 
Development Plans and the first Operational Programme for Regional 
Development (for 2000/06). With the OPRD and the introduction of the NUTS 
territorial system, the expansion of PHARE funding post-1999 (see Table 2 and 
Figure 1) allowed policy to finance a wider range of more targeted regional 
interventions – although as was shown earlier, this did not really obtain a clear 
redistributive character nor did it prioritise on the most needy areas.  
Overall, the policy innovations in this period (under the 1999 Act) were not 
always well-thought32 and suffered from a number of deficiencies, including 
the lack of a clear demarcation of the functions of each body involved in 
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 For example, the 1999 Regular Report (EC, 1999a) devoted less than a page on ‘regional policy and 
cohesion’ and still this was subsumed under the chapter on ‘Employment and Social Cohesion’ (pp.45-
47).  
32
 In some instances they were even incompatible with general EU rules. For example, the budgetary 
provisions of the 1999 Regional Development Act, with regards to absorption of EU Structural Funds, 
was in breach of EC Regulation No1260/99 (Minkova, 2004; Dimitrova and Sirak, 2005).  
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regional policy and the limited provisions for monitoring and evaluation of the 
implemented policies and projects (Minkova, 2004; Dimitrova and Sakir, 
2005). Crucially, however, they had three more salient and very negative 
implications. First, by adhering to a perceived (but vaguely defined) dominant 
‘European acquis’ on regional policy, very limited attention was paid to 
developing an own national regional policy (Dimitrova and Sakir, 2005) and 
the few elements of an independent national regional policy that were in place 
were subordinated to the externally designed framework for regional 
interventions under PHARE. Second, by relying on and replicating an 
architecture that was practically designed for countries with already well-
established structures of national regional policy, Bulgaria’s regional policy 
adopted (i) a macro-geographic perspective (based on NUTS-2 regions) that 
was largely non-representative of the actual scale of spatial disparities in the 
country33; and (ii) a set of policy priorities that were often non-reflective of the 
actual nation-wide regional development needs (especially with respect to the 
issue of connectivity but more elementarily also with regards to the prioritising 
between ‘areas of purposeful intervention’ and border regions under PHARE). 
Third, the adoption of EU’s fiscal decentralisation model contributed to 
increasing the problems of governance and effectiveness of policies, raised the 
bargaining power of individual municipalities (thus fostering distortionary 
forms of intra-regional competition – Brusis, 2002), and thus hindered the slow 
and smooth adaptation of the regional institutions and policies to the new 
conditions of the post-transition / pre-accession era (Minkova, 2004).34 It is the 
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 The revision of the NUTS-2 geography in 2006 made in fact this situation worse (Monastiriotis, 
2008) – an observation which reinforces the point about the negative aspect of adhering 
uncritically/unconditionally to an externally inspired design.   
34
 Despite this, Bulgaria is still committed to strengthening further fiscal decentralisation – albeit with 
very slow steps of implementation. In 2005 a Memorandum for decentralisation and capacity building 
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combination of all these factors that led to the development of ineffective 
regional policies and a continuing widening of regional and sub-regional 
disparities in Bulgaria until the turn of the century.   
Importantly, with the process of the accession negotiations (especially the 
negotiations under Chapter 2135) and informed by the experience of the first 
OPRD, recently the design and structure of objectives of regional policy in 
Bulgaria has changed dramatically.36 In 2004 a new Regional Development Act 
was enacted and a new National Strategy for Regional Development (for 
2005/10) was developed, leading in 2005 to the formulation of the new 
Operational Programme for Regional Development for the country’s first post-
accession planning period (2007/13 – MRDPW, 2005; NSRF, 2007). Although 
the administrative structure of regional policy under the new Act (and the new 
OPRD) is not significantly changed (Minkova, 2004), the relation between the 
various Regional Development Plans (national, regional, district-level, 
municipal) has been clarified better (Dimitrova and Sirak, 2005) and good 
progress has been made with regards to monitoring and evaluation (EC, 2004 
and 2007). But the most significant policy innovations are with the setting of 
the wider objectives of regional policy and with the designing of policies in a 
very European(ised) manner. For example, the 2007/13 OPRD (i) identifies for 
a first time so explicitly the importance and nature of intra-regional disparities 
in the country; (ii) relates, again for the first time, explicitly to a number of EU 
                                                                                                                                            
was signed between the government and the National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of 
Bulgaria while the 2007 revision of the Constitution of Bulgaria also introduced a provision for local 
tax-financing for municipalities (which, however, has not yet been transposed into law).  
35
 Chapter 21 is the chapter devoted on Regional and Cohesion Policies in the Accession Negotiations 
for the adoption of the EU acquis.  
36
 This was complemented by initiatives by other international organisations and institutions. Among 
them, of catalytic role was a series of UN Reports (e.g., UNDP, 1999, 2000 and 2002; UNICEF, 2004) 
that helped measure and emphasise the size and character of the regional problems in the country and 
provided needed data that helped shape the development of policy priorities (Marinov and Malhassian, 
2003).  
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documents and processes (e.g., the Community Strategic Guidelines – see EC, 
2005a; or the European Spatial Development Perspective – see EC, 1999b); 
(iii) identifies five thematic priority areas37; and above all (iv) introduces for a 
first time a National Spatial Urban Model, based on a polycentric development 
approach in line with EU’s Spatial Development Plan. Although some 
problems with regards to administrative decentralisation (for NUTS-2 
authorities) and financial management and control remain (EC, 2004 and 
2005b), Bulgaria closed successfully its Chapter 21 negotiations with the EU 
and is today considered to have developed a functional and effective 
‘European’ regional policy (EC, 2007). The influence of the EU in these 
developments is unambiguous. The architecture of the new OPRD reflects 
clearly the constraints stemming from the restructuring of EU’s own cohesion 
policy, with the shift in its emphasis on thematic interventions (point iii above) 
that are made more explicitly consistent with the revised Lisbon Strategy (point 
ii above) and form part of a wider spatial strategy for Europe (points i and iv 
above).  
With these developments, some further steps have been made also in the 
direction of establishing a firmer framework for national regional policy. A 
2002 Decree (CM, 2002) has helped clarify the set of incentives under regional 
state aid (tax exemptions, grants and subsidised loans) while a set of successive 
regulations on regional incentives (included in the various Corporate Income 
Tax Acts) have simplified the designation of areas for assistance. Area 
designation for regional incentives is now based on a single criterion of 
unemployment above 50% of the national average, with assisted areas being 
                                                 
37
 These include: urban regeneration and development; local and regional connectivity; sustainable 
tourism development; encouraging regional and local development; and technical assistance (MRDPW, 
2005). 
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eligible for tax exemptions of up to 100% and state grants of between 50% and 
75% (for large and small enterprises, respectively).  
Figure 2. Areas of regional assistance and areas for regional development 
 
Legend: Map A: shaded areas are areas for regional assistance; Map B: agglomeration, central and 
peripheral areas shaded dark-grey, grey and light-grey, respectively.  
Source: Map A: Bulgarian Investment Agency (http://www.iinbulgaria.com/incentives.htm); Map B: 
MRDPW (2005). 
 
Despite these significant improvements, however, some of the main 
deficiencies identified in the first NRDP remain present today. On the one 
hand, the framework for regional development remains rather complex, with 
too many institutions sharing responsibility for design and implementation and 
too many documents setting up the policy objectives and priorities. Perhaps 
two are the most striking examples of this. First, as has been noted, two of the 
main policy documents effectively disagree on the fundamental principle of 
regional policy (defined as the ‘elimination of regional discrepancies’ by CM, 
2005, but as the achievement of ‘balanced and sustainable development’ by 
NSRF, 2007). Second, area designation falls within the responsibility of two 
different ministries (Ministry of Finance for regional incentives; MRDPW for 
regional development) and naturally produces two rather distinct maps for 
regional interventions in the country – as is depicted in the two maps of Figure 
2. To add to this complexity, under the 2007/13 Financial Perspective the 
whole territory of Bulgaria, including the Capital Sofia, is eligible for EU funds 
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and thus there is no element there of positive discrimination to favour the least 
developed (and, by implication, least absorptive) regions in the county. On the 
other hand, problems remain with the limited know-how and institutional 
capacity of the municipalities (NUTS-4) as well as with the weak 
administrative powers of the intermediate (NUTS-2) regional tier – this 
effectively maintains the mixed top-down / bottom-up approach to regional 
policy38 introduced more than a decade ago that arguably constrains the 
establishment of partnerships and the development of integrated programmes 
within an inter-regional perspective. Finally, despite the significant increase in 
the level of EU support in the 2007/13 period,39 the continuing adherence to the 
EU (fiscal) decentralisation ‘model’ (subsidiarity, co-financing), combined 
with the inherent problems of clientelism and corruption and the low absorptive 
capacity of the least developed areas, raises serious questions with regards to 
the ability of the most needy of them to benefit the most from the new domestic 
and European regional policy architectures, especially in a context where 
absorption of EU funds is expected to diminish.40 These features can become to 
represent very real constraints on the effectiveness and the redistributive 
capacity of Bulgaria’s emerging regional policy and thus ultimately on the 
narrowing of spatial disparities in the country. 
 
                                                 
38
 Minkova (2004) calls this a model of ‘de-concentration than decentralisation’ (p.22). 
39
 Bulgaria’s allocation of Cohesion and Structural Funds for the 2007/13 period are estimated to 
around 4% of its GDP per annum (Andronova-Vincelette and Vassileva, 2005). They are expected to 
generate by 2013 additional GDP, productivity and employment of 12%, 7% and 5%, respectively (EC, 
2006). 
40
 Evidence from the CEECs suggests that absorption of PHARE funds is significantly greater than for 
funds from the Cohesion and Structural Funds (Mrak and Rant, 2006; Marinov et al, 2006). Note also 
that less developed municipalities face a disproportionate burden in following developments in 
Brussels (e.g. due to sparsely populated relevant Offices – see footnote 22) and are of course helped 
less by fiscal decentralisation, as they have a limited tax base from which to raise funds for co-
financing.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
Emerging out of a phase of sub-optimal central planning, huge external debts, 
and strong dependence on the collapsing Soviet economy, Bulgaria faced 
quickly a range of regional problems and challenges that were diverse and 
multi-faceted: limited economic and functional connectivity between its 
regional economies, negligible diffusion/spillover dynamics, substantial intra-
regional and very localised disparities and spatial heterogeneity, and combined 
problems of industrial decline, rural/mountainous underdevelopment, and 
brain-drain emigration. Initially, the interventions of the IMF and other 
international organisations placed emphasis on macro-economic stabilisation 
and market liberalisation, thus undermining the key priorities of (any) regional 
and cohesion policy. Despite some developments through ‘institution building’ 
(1991 Local Self-Government Act), owing to political (as well as ethnic and 
power) considerations an implicit decision was taken by the central 
administration to favour ‘balanced growth’ over ‘regional convergence’ and 
relative centralisation by weakening the regional tier. In this period, public 
investment was low and regionally identifiable expenditure was for all practical 
purposes non-existent (apart from the poorly financed municipal budgets), 
while the EU had assumed only a subordinate role through the allotting of its 
PHARE funds. Bulgaria’s own internal limitations explain, at least partly, the 
significant delay, initially, in the design and implementation of regional 
policies. Elements of path-dependence that hinder further regional development 
still exist, mainly in the weak authority of the regional tier and the primacy of 
the objective of ‘balanced growth’ over regional convergence.   
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On the other hand, after a slow start, in the period following the financial crisis 
of 1997 the external factor has been catalytic in mobilising and initiating 
integrated regional development plans, policies and structures. With the more 
active involvement of the EU (through its conditionality and the accession 
negotiations under Chapter 21) and the UN (Human Development Reports) and 
the economic and political stabilisation, some more promising elements of a 
regional policy were put in place, leading to the first Regional Operational 
Programme in 2000. But financing was limited, the administrative and 
institutional structures were too complex, the policy objectives were often not 
well-linked, and priority was mainly given to border regions, rural areas and 
capacity-building, thus not necessarily matching the on-the-ground priorities 
and true regional economic needs. The role of the EU was catalytic in the 
development of regional policy in Bulgaria and in Europeanising its 
administrative-territorial system, although this has not always been in the 
direction that the nature of the regional problems of the country would dictate. 
Although the ‘external pressure’ of the EU, as a manager of Bulgaria’s 
accession aspirations, gave an impetus for regional policy that was lacking 
internally (and further strengthened the cooperation networks and structures by 
necessitating the participation in the design of regional policy of various local 
and regional stakeholders and NGOs and the establishment of Regional 
Development Agencies), it did in fact have a number of adverse and perhaps 
long-lasting implications. These include the inconsistency between the 
domestic economic geography and the externally inspired NUTS-2 geography; 
the character of the administrative structures that, in the context of a developing 
transition economy, is conducive to antagonisms and competition; the limited 
absorptive capacity and developing culture of aid-dependency of the local 
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economies and administrations; and, above all, the complete dominance of the 
European orientation of regional policy. This orientation largely conditioned 
the development of an effective, complementary but independent (in line with 
the additionality principle), national regional economic policy.  
This last observation should be emphasised further. It has been noted in the 
literature that, in the process of transition, post-communist countries were faced 
with a ‘dual transition’ challenge for regional policy (Brusis, 1999, p.19): 
firstly, a transformation from centralised administrative structures to a more 
participatory and decentralised framework for regional policy; and secondly, a 
process of modernisation, with a shift in the objectives of regional policy from 
traditional redistribution and equalibration to a more contemporary approach 
that focuses on strengthening local capacities for indigenous development. In 
the case of Bulgaria, where national regional policy was particularly thin even 
in the 1980s, the need for transformation and modernisation was perhaps even 
more important.41 In this context, Bulgaria’s adherence to the EU regional 
policy framework, which has clearly been designed to complement rather than 
to replace national regional policies (and as such it cannot totally fill a 
country’s vacuum in national regional policy by itself), raises important 
questions about the effectiveness and suitability of current and future regional 
policy interventions in the country, as much as it does about the role of the EU 
in shaping regional policy in the new and prospective accession countries.  
                                                 
41
 It is of course debateable whether the relative void of national regional policy facilitates or hinders a 
speedier and less costly progress with regards to this ‘dual transition’. In any case, this observation 
goes beyond the point made here, namely that the vacuum in national regional policy was filled with a 
not unproblematic adoption of a (European) framework that was designed to complement rather than to 
replace national regional policy.   
  37 
There is a central question regarding this: has the EU, implicitly or explicitly, 
in Bulgaria and in other transition/accession countries, favoured a specific 
policy paradigm, that incidentally was less or more suitable for countries of 
different levels of development, different initial conditions and different 
transition speeds; or was it instead limited (and, in that sense, also limiting) to 
simply motivating policymakers to move swiftly towards developing some, 
any, type of regional policy, often with the implication that policies were less 
well-thought and/or well-designed? Drawing from the experience of Bulgaria, 
it seems that the answer is lying somewhere in the middle. The EU projected, 
with some delay and without particularly ‘hard’ conditionality (Hughes et al, 
2001; Brusis, 2002), a specific policy paradigm of supra-national regional 
policy; in the absence of a strong tradition of national regional policy, and 
perhaps filtered through the specific internal constraints and limitations of the 
country (e.g., slow transition, low levels of development, low FDI, etc), 
Bulgaria adopted this paradigm rather literally, albeit with some mistakes 
initially and some positive policy learning more recently; but in the process of 
‘downloading’ and ‘learning’, Bulgaria largely failed, at least until very 
recently, to find the appropriate geographical scale for its regional interventions 
and to develop an own national regional policy that would be compatible with, 
and add to, the EU leg of regional policy.  
Nevertheless, Bulgaria enters its post-accession period with a regional policy 
framework that appears both reasonably well-designed and above all consistent 
with the EU acquis. Funding is increased and the inflow of much-needed 
resources should trigger the development of the main agglomeration / target 
areas and eventually the diffusion of growth to the periphery. But success of 
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regional and cohesion policies depends on absorptive capacity. With the 
transition from PHARE to CSF financing, the potential is there that efforts for 
regional development in the country may be further hindered, or at least partly 
compromised, in its post-accession future. As the role of the external factor has 
been dramatically transformed over the years, Bulgaria may have to look into 
its own domestic limitations and constraints to find the appropriate institutional 
and socio-political configurations that will facilitate the harmonious 
development of the national component of regional policy and the efficient 
operation of the chosen regional interventions, so as to effectively tackle the 
continuing problems of polarisation, backwardness and unconnectedness that 
characterise the Bulgarian sub-national economic space.  
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